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Abstract 
 
Every day, people make decisions about whether to 
trust machines with their personal information, such as 
letting a phone track one’s location. How do people 
decide whether to trust a machine? In a field 
experiment, we tested how two modes of interaction—
expression modality, whether the person is talking or 
typing to a machine, and response modality, whether the 
machine is talking or typing back—influence the 
willingness to trust a machine. Based on research that 
expressing oneself verbally reduces self-control 
compared to nonverbal expression, we predicted that 
talking to a machine might make people more willing to 
share their personal information. Based on research on 
the link between anthropomorphism and trust, we 
further predicted that machines who talked (versus 
texted) would seem more human-like and be trusted 
more. Using a popular chatterbot phone application, we 
randomly assigned over 300 community members to 
either talk or type to the phone, which either talked or 
typed in return. We then measured how much 
participants anthropomorphized the machine and their 
willingness to share their personal information (e.g., 
their location, credit card information) with it. Results 
revealed that talking made people more willing to share 
their personal information than texting, and this was 
robust to participants’ self-reported comfort with 
technology, age, gender, and conversation 
characteristics. But listening to the application’s voice 
did not affect anthropomorphism or trust compared to 
reading its text. We conclude by considering the 
theoretical and practical implications of this experiment 
for understanding how people trust machines.  
 
1. Introduction 
Every day, people make decisions about whether to 
trust machines with their personal information. From 
entering one’s credit card number into a company’s 
website to allowing a phone to track one’s location, 
these decisions require trusting machines with personal, 
and potentially sensitive, information. How do people 
decide whether to trust a machine? We explore how the 
modality by which people interact with machines can 
affect how much they are willing to trust them with 
personal information. Specifically we consider two 
criteria—whether the user is typing or talking to the 
machine (i.e., expression modality) and whether the 
machine is typing or talking back (i.e., response 
modality).  
We draw from two primary findings across the 
diverse fields of cognition, neuroscience, and social 
psychology to form predictions about the effect of 
expression and response modality on machine trust. 
First, expression modality should primarily affect the 
user’s cognitive state. Indeed, research on expression 
modality suggests that verbal (versus nonverbal or 
physical) modes of expression can reduce self-control 
behavior [1-3]. For instance, verbally expressing one’s 
choice (i.e., speaking) increases heuristic decision-
making and indulgence, thereby reducing self-control, 
compared to physically expressing one’s choice (e.g., 
button pressing, pointing, typing) for identical self-
control dilemmas [1]. As such, we expect that having a 
spoken conversation with a machine, as opposed to a 
typed conversation, may make users more likely to give 
up personal information, failing to exert control over 
their information.  
Second, response modality should primarily affect 
the user’s perception of the machine. A machine that can 
create speech should be judged as more human-like than 
a machine that creates text. One set of experiments 
illustrated this directly: when participants read a piece 
of text that had been created by either a human or 
machine, they were less likely to believe the text had 
been written by a human than those who heard the same 
text spoken aloud [4].Furthermore, anthropomorphizing 
a machine by assuming it is more humanlike (e.g., 
seems more rational, competent, thoughtful, and even 
emotional) may increase trust. For example, self-driving 
cars with human voices seem more human-like and are 
trusted more by users [5]. These data lead us to predict 
that users will trust talking machines more than texting 
machines.  
However, there are at least two important caveats 
that may exist in the relationship between response 
modality and trust. First, anthropomorphism is unlikely 
to always lead to trust. For instance, users feel 
threatened by machines that seem too intelligent [6]. 
Therefore, the level of machine competence, and 
whether or not the machine seems threatening, may 
matter. Second, the quality of the voice is also likely to 
matter when evoking anthropomorphism. Prior research 
suggests that only humanlike speech with voices that 
naturalistically vary in pitch, amplitude, and rate of 
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speech, can increase perceptions of humanization [4, 7]. 
In contrast, more monotone and robotic voices may be 
judged no differently from text.  
In a field experiment, we test the effect of 
expression modality and response modality on trust in 
machines. We predict two main effects: that talking to a 
machine, and being talked to, will increase trust. It is 
also possible that these two variables could interact. For 
example, the effect of response modality might be larger 
when the user is talking to the machine than typing to 
the machine, because it feels more like a real 
conversation with both agents talk to one another. We 
therefore tested for interactions in addition to main 
effects.  
 
1.1. Trust in Machines 
 
Trust is an essential ingredient in social interaction 
that influences decisions about how people will behave 
toward others in personal and organizational contexts. 
For example, having trust improves the stability of 
economic and political exchange [8], reduces 
transaction costs [9], facilitates cooperation [10], and 
helps firms and individuals manage risk [11]. 
Conversely, trust violations can harm cooperation and 
bargaining outcomes [12, 13], lower organizational 
commitment [14], provoke retaliation [15], and even 
trigger organizational-level failures [16]. Golembiewski 
and McConkie [16, p. 131] argued that, ‘‘There is no 
single variable which so thoroughly influences 
interpersonal and group behavior as does trust.’’ 
Extending from this literature, trust is not just a 
critical predictor of how humans behave toward other 
humans, but also of how humans behave toward 
machines. It has particular security implications, 
whereby humans may become vulnerable to machine 
attacks if they mistakenly put their trust in machines. 
Consistent with prior research, we define trust as ‘‘a 
psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions or behavior of another’’ [18, p. 395]. By this 
definition, the decision to trust another agent is 
contingent on two aspects: the person’s own 
psychological state and the person’s expectations about 
the agent’s intentions. The former may be influenced by 
expression modality, because expressing oneself 
differently can change a person’s mindset, and the latter 
influenced by response modality, because the machine’s 
responsiveness can affect anthropomorphism.    
 
1.2. Expression Modality and Trust 
 
Although the normative principle of procedure 
invariance predicts that expression modality should not 
affect decision-making, a great deal of psychological 
research suggests just the opposite. A prominent 
example is the Stroop task [19], a classic self-control 
task whereby participants are presented with color 
words (e.g., blue, green) printed in the opposite colored 
ink (e.g., the word “blue” printed in green ink). The 
participant’s task is to verbalize the ink color, overriding 
the automatic tendency to verbalize the word itself. 
Interestingly, when participants enter their response 
manually, via a keystroke, the Stroop effect is smaller 
than when they speak the colors aloud [2]. This effect 
persists even with practice [20]. Consistent with these 
findings, there tends to be greater activation an area of 
the brain associated with identifying self-control 
conflicts, the cognitive/dorsal area of the anterior 
cingulate cortex, during manual response to the Stroop 
task than during oral response [3, 21]. 
One recent set of eighteen experiments tested the 
effect of expression modality on decision-making 
among consumers making choices relevant to self-
control (e.g., between an apple or candy) [1]. These 
experiments manipulated whether the participant spoke 
to indicate their choice, compared to non-verbal 
preferences modalities such as clicking, button-
pressing, pointing, taking, or writing. Across the set of 
studies, speaking tended to result in the more indulgent 
choice. One possible reason for these findings is that 
speaking triggers a heuristic mindset, whereby people 
rely more on their intuitive preferences.  
If spoken interaction elicits greater behavioral 
disinhibition than text-based interaction, as the 
aforementioned literature suggests, this may have 
implications for a user’s willingness to trust a machine. 
Indeed, prior research among humans demonstrates that 
reduced inhibition increases social disclosure [e.g., due 
to alcohol consumption, 22, or visual anonymity, 23]. In 
other words, people who feel more disinhibited might 
also be more likely to disclose to their interaction 
partner. Moreover, this effect could even be cyclical: 
greater disclosure can lead to greater liking, which 
further increases disclosure [24]. In sum, the prior 
research on expression modality, self-control, and 
disclosure lead us to predict that talking a machine 
might lead a user to be more likely to share personal 
information with it, compared to typing to the machine.  
 
1.3. Response Modality and Trust 
 
Prior research in person perception examines how 
observing a person via different communication 
media—for example, being able to hear a person (e.g., 
via an audio clip) or read a person’s thoughts (e.g., a 
transcribed speech or written statement)—influence 
how observers make judgments about the person’s 
mental capacities and mental states. In one line of 
research, observers seem to have greater empathic 
accuracy—can more accurately discern a 
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communicator’s self-reported thoughts and feelings—
when they hear a communicator speak than when they 
read the same content [22-25]. For instance, observers 
can more accurately predict sarcasm and humor when 
they can hear the communicator compared to when they 
read the same statements [26]. A second, even more 
relevant line of research examines how communication 
cues affect not just judgments of people’s mental states 
but also judgments of their mental capacities. For 
instance, observers who listen to a spoken statement 
from a job candidate about he or she should be hired for 
a job believe the candidate seems more intelligent and 
hence employable than observers who read the same 
statements [27]. Further, observers who listen to their 
political opponents are less likely to dehumanize 
opponents than those who read the same statements [7].  
The aforementioned findings suggest it is easier to 
infer mental states and mental capacities in a person 
when hearing his or her spoken language compared to 
reading the same language in text or seeing it 
(nonverbally). Extending from this “person perception” 
research, we turn to machine perception. We propose 
that machines equipped with human speech will seem 
particularly mentally capable and therefore more 
human. This suggests, for example, that avatars that 
have human bodies but not human voices may be less 
convincingly humanlike, and therefore less trusted, than 
those that lack body but have a voice. Two empirical 
results support our prediction.  
First, Waytz, Heafner, and Epley (2014) conducted 
an experiment to anthropomorphize a self-driving car. 
Passengers in a self-driving car simulator whose car had 
a name, gender, and human voice in the GPS (the 
anthropomorphized condition) reported that their car 
seemed more humanlike and rational and they trusted 
their car more compared to passengers in the same 
simulator whose car was given no name or gender and 
had a computer voice for GPS (the control condition). 
This experiment did not provide a clean test of visual 
cues compared to voice cues for anthropomorphism, but 
it did suggest that adding voice can be humanizing and 
it also demonstrated that anthropomorphism can lead to 
trust.  
Second, Schroeder and Epley (2016) conducted a 
series of experiments using a “Turing Test” paradigm in 
which participants guessed whether the content of a 
script had been created by a computer or a human. 
Participants either read a script or saw it being recited 
by an actor through different media which provided 
audiovisual, only visual, or only audio information 
across experiments. Participants were consistently most 
likely to believe the script was created by a human when 
they heard a human voice reciting it, compared to 
whether they read it or watched it. This was true whether 
the script had actually been created by a human or a 
computer. 
But voice may not always be humanizing. In one 
experiment, Schroeder and Epley (2016) compared the 
effect of different types of voices on humanization. 
They asked actors to read written statements aloud in a 
“mindful” way—taking the perspective of the writer and 
imbuing their words with thought and feeling—or in a 
“mindless” way—reading the words as if they had no 
meaning. Evaluators were more likely to infer the script 
was created by a human when they heard the mindful 
(vs. mindless) voices, an effect mediated by variance in 
intonation. This suggests that perhaps only mindful, 
humanlike voices—those that have naturalistic variance 
in intonation, for instance—will make evaluators 
believe an agent has greater mental capacity. 
There is also reason to believe that the causal 
relationship between anthropomorphism and trust is 
more complicated than these few experiments would 
suggest. Machines that are perceived to have greater 
capacity to think, while seeming more humanlike, may 
also seem more capable of deception, a trait considered 
toxic to trust [28]. People are particularly wary of 
seemingly intelligent robots who might steal their jobs, 
a phenomenon referred to in the media as “botsourcing” 
[6]. Therefore, capacity to think may increase trust 
curvilinearly—machines that seem somewhat more 
intelligent may be trusted but machines that seem 
extremely intelligent (e.g., devious) may not be trusted. 
Regarding capacity to feel, recent research suggests that 
when people perceive machines to have greater capacity 
to feel, it gives them moral standing [29], which may in 
turn afford greater trust. In one experiment, consumers 
that were induced to believe their cars were more 
interpersonally warm used more humanlike traits to 
describe their cars and were less likely to get rid of them 
[30], suggesting warmth may increase trust. Based on 
this small body of literature, we predict that people will 
be more likely to trust machines with humanlike voices 
that seem more capable of thinking and feeling, but that 
particularly intelligent machines may seem threatening 
to humans, making them less likely to share personal 
information. 
 
1.4. Current Study 
 
We tested our two predictions, that talking to a 
machine and being talked to by a machine will affect 
trusting behavior toward the machine, in a field 
experiment. We collected over 300 participants in a 
geographical location in which participants would be 
relatively familiar with interacting with machines (near 
Silicon Valley, California). We collected community 
members on a busy street intersection outside a 
University campus to increase our diversity in 
participants’ demographic characteristics. We selected a 
“chatbot” machine with which users could converse 
called Cleverbot. 
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In addition to manipulating whether users talked or 
typed, and whether the machine talked or typed in 
return, our experiment also manipulated Cleverbot’s 
gender (male or female). If people apply human gender 
stereotypes to machines, as some research suggests [31], 
the machine’s perceived gender could influence users’ 
trust as well. Therefore our field experiment had eight 
conditions in a 2 (user’s expression modality: talk, type) 
× 2 (machine’s response modality: talk, type) × 2 
(machine’s gender: male, female) between-participants 
fully randomized experimental design. Users interacted 
with the machine in one of these eight conditions, then 
evaluated the machine on a survey and reported their 
willingness to provide personal information to it.  
 
2. Method 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
We recruited 304 adults (Mage = 22.91, SDage = 7.67, 
8 participants failed to report age; 44.4% male, 51.6% 
female, 3.9% opted not to report gender) on a busy street 
corner outside of a west-coast University campus to be 
in the experiment. Participants received a food item of 
their choice for their time.  
 
2.2. Machine Selection 
 
Running this experiment required a machine that 
could talk to users or type to users, and would allow 
users to talk or type in return. It further required a 
machine with a relatively humanlike voice that we could 
manipulate as either female or male. We examined 
virtual assistant and entertainment applications to 
identify a machine that had exactly this functionality. 
Our search revealed a machine that fit our needs: a 
chatterbot application called “Cleverbot.” Developed by 
artificial intelligence scientist Rollo Carpenter, this 
application uses an algorithm to have conversations 
with humans. Its responses are not pre-programmed but 
rather learnt from human input. Cleverbot has held over 
200 million conversations since it went online in 1997, 
and it is growing in data size at a rate of 4 to 7 million 
interactions per second. 
Because our intent in this experiment was to 
manipulate anthropomorphism, we wanted a machine 
that would seem relatively humanlike. Cleverbot also 
fits this criteria: In the 2011 Turing test competition, 
Cleverbot was judged to be 59.3% human, compared to 
the rating of 63.3% human achieved by human 
participants. We further preferred a machine with a 
humanlike voice. We were unable to find pre-existing 
data on the quality of Cleverbot’s voice, so we collected 
some data during our own study. 
We used the iPhone application version of 
Cleverbot for our experiment. Users interacted with the 
phone by speaking into its microphone or typing on the 
phone keyboard. Cleverbot then responded either via 
text or in the standard male or female U.S. English voice 
pre-loaded onto the phone. 
 
2.3. Procedure  
 
Once a participant agreed to take part on our study, 
we randomly assigned him or her to one of eight 
possible experimental conditions. We did not run 
participants who indicated that they were already 
familiar with Cleverbot. We collected verbal consent 
from the participant and explained that the participant 
would interact with Cleverbot and then evaluate him or 
her on a survey. We then showed participants the phone 
application, which was pre-loaded on the 
experimenter’s phone with the correct settings based on 
the experimental condition. We gave participants a short 
introduction about Cleverbot (“He [she] is primarily 
used for entertainment. He [she] has a great personality 
and can interact with you.”) and then demonstrated how 
to use Cleverbot by asking, “Hi, how are you?” either 
verbally or via text. The Cleverbot interface is depicted 
in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Participants received a list of questions to ask 
Cleverbot for the interaction. We developed these 
questions to yield consistently sensible responses from 
Cleverbot (1. What do you do for fun? 2. Tell me a joke. 
3. What’s the meaning of life? 4. Are you my friend?) 
We encouraged participants not to deviate from these 
questions to ensure consistency between experimental 
conditions. However, we also recorded participants’ 
conversations to determine whether there were any 
differences in context exchanged based on experimental 
condition.  
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Once participants completed testing the 
application, we explained: “We are trying to develop 
Cleverbot into a virtual personal assistant. We want to 
know if it would be a useful product for people.” 
Finally, participants completed a survey evaluating their 
experience and impressions of Cleverbot.  
 
2.4. Survey 
 
The survey consisted of three parts: “Evaluations of 
Cleverbot,” “Giving Cleverbot access to your phone,” 
and “General Questions.” In Part 1, users completed five 
questions measuring anthropomorphism drawn from the 
Human Uniqueness scale (Bastian & Haslam, 2010): 1. 
How intelligent did he [she] seem? 2. How responsive 
did he [she] seem? 3. How sophisticated did he [she] 
seem? 4. How superficial (lacking depth) did he [she] 
seem? 5. To what extend did he [she] seem to have a 
mind of his [her] own? They responded to each question 
on 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) Likert scales. These five 
items formed our primary measure of 
anthropomorphism (α = .76). We also asked how fast 
Cleverbot seemed, on the same response scale, to 
control for response speed differences across 
conditions.  
In Part 2, the survey asked participants to check 
which of their phone applications and personal 
information they would be willing to give Cleverbot 
(see Figure 2). We provided seven phone applications 
(calendar, contacts, location, Facebook, email, camera, 
photos/videos) and five pieces of personal information 
(full name, home address, credit card number, Amazon 
purchase history, Internet search history), thereby 
allowing the participant to check up to 12 items. For 
each option, we also provided the reason why Cleverbot 
would need to access it. The total number of items that 
participants were willing to give access to formed our 
primary measure of behavioral trust. The survey also 
asked participants directly, “Overall, how much would 
trust Cleverbot with your personal, private 
information?” (1=Not at all; 7=A great deal).  
 
Figure 2.  
 
 
Finally, in Part 3 of the survey, we asked 
participants “Overall, how comfortable are you when 
approaching new technology?” (1=Not at all 
comfortable; 7=Extremely comfortable) and “Overall 
how familiar are you with using virtual assistants (such 
as SIRI)?” (1=Not at all familiar; 7=Extremely 
familiar). We collected participants’ demographic 
information (e.g., age, gender). Among participants who 
listened to Cleverbot, we asked, “How much did you 
like Cleverbot’s voice?” (1=Not at all; 7=A great deal) 
as an approximation of the quality of the voice. 
 
2.5. Conversation Coding 
 
There was wide variety in the topics of participants’ 
conversations with Cleverbot, which ranged from 
asking over 10 questions to asking only the 4 questions 
that we required.  Due to technical issues, we only 
recorded 179 of the 304 conversations (59%). Three 
research assistants divided up each set of user’s 
questions and Cleverbot’s answers within each 
conversation, resulting in 923 conversation threads. 
They rated them on three criteria: whether or not 
Cleverbot’s response was sensible, whether or not 
Cleverbot’s response was relevant to the question that 
was asked, and whether not Cleverbot’s response was 
entertaining. These three ratings had adequate reliability 
across the raters (αs = .72, .83, and .69) [32]. 
 
3. Results 
 
We first tested the effect of our experimental 
conditions on behavioral trust (the sum of things to 
which participants allowed Cleverbot access, out of 12) 
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by running a 2 (user’s expression modality: talk, type) × 
2 (machine’s response modality: talk, type) × 2 
(machine’s gender: male, female) between-participants 
ANOVA analysis. We found the predicted main effect 
of expression modality, F(1, 294) = 6.97, p = .009, such 
that users who talked to Cleverbot gave it more access 
(M = 6.45, SD = 3.07) than users who texted (M = 5.53, 
SD = 2.89). However, there was no effect of response 
modality, F(1, 294) = 0.01, p = .907, or the machine’s 
gender, F(1, 294) = 1.42, p = .234, or any interactions 
between conditions, Fs < 1.  
We next ran the same analysis in a linear regression 
model, but also controlling for participants’ self-
reported comfort with new technology, their age, their 
familiarity interacting with virtual assistants, and their 
gender (1=female; 0=male). This analysis revealed the 
same results; expression modality predicted behavioral 
trust (β = .157, p = .008) but response modality and 
gender did not (ps = .937 & .340, respectively). Comfort 
with new technology (β = .214, p = .003), participants’ 
age (β = -.133, p = .025), and participants’ gender (β = -
.116, p = .055) each also predicted behavioral trust such 
that participants who were more comfortable with 
technology, younger, and male were more likely to trust 
the machine. Although the effects of comfort with 
technology and age were not surprising, we did not 
anticipate an effect of participants’ gender. However, 
we note that this effect was only marginally statistically 
significant and should be tested in future research to see 
if it will replicate. We further tested whether the match 
in participants’ gender and the machine’s gender 
increased trust; it did not, p > .250. Familiarity with 
virtual assistants also did not predict trust, p > .250). 
Finally, controlling for the perceived speed of the 
interaction did not meaningfully change any of these 
results nor did it independently predict trust, p > .250.  
Our predicted mechanism via which response 
modality could influence trust in machines was 
anthropomorphism. Consistent with our lack of an effect 
on behavioral trust, there was also no effect of response 
modality condition on our anthropomorphism measure, 
F(1, 295) = 0.02, p = .901. There were also no 
significant effects of other experimental conditions, or 
interactions, on anthropomorphism, Fs < 3.44, ps < 
.065. Surprisingly, when we tested for effects of 
condition on explicit self-reported trust of Cleverbot, 
there were no effects, Fs < 1.50, ps > .221. This suggests 
that expression modality may influence behavioral trust 
but not self-reported trust of Cleverbot. However, as we 
would expect, there was a strong positive relationship 
between self-reported and behavioral trust, r = .622, p < 
.001, and a smaller but also positive relationship 
between anthropomorphism and behavioral trust, r = 
.186, p < .001.  
In a regression analysis predicting behavioral trust 
including all of the controls listed previously (comfort 
with new technology, user age and gender, and 
familiarity with virtual assistants), as well as 
anthropomorphism and self-reported trust, the effect of 
expression modality remained significant (β = .134, p = 
.006). Interestingly, in this model the effect of 
anthropomorphism was negative (β = -.094, p = .094), 
whereas self-reported trust remained a positive predictor 
(β = .652, p < .001). The effects of comfort with new 
technology and user age became non-significant, 
suggesting that these effects on behavioral trust are 
operating at least in part via self-reported trust. Further 
controlling for the coded conversation characteristics in 
the same analysis revealed no difference in results, and 
none of the conversation characteristics predicted 
behavioral trust.  
 
4. General Discussion 
 
Modern technology continues to integrate 
characteristics and capabilities associated with artificial 
intelligence. How users interact with this technology 
can influence their likelihood for trusting machines with 
their personal and sensitive information. Understanding 
these interactions is integral to guiding secure 
development as well as use. However, no prior research 
has systematically examined the effect of the modality 
of interaction on trust in machines. In a field experiment 
with over 300 participants, we disentangle the effect of 
two forms of interaction modality on trust for the first 
time. Our results revealed that expression modality, 
specifically whether the user is talking to a machine or 
texting with a machine, can meaningfully influence 
trust, but response modality, whether the machines talks 
or types in return, may be less influential. Users who 
talked to a “virtual assistant” phone application were 
willing to share more of their personal information with 
the application than users who typed. This finding was 
robust to participants’ age, gender, comfort with new 
technology, and familiarity with virtual assistants. But 
whether the application talked or typed back to the 
participant did not affect willingness to share. 
Furthermore, the purported gender of the application did 
not meaningfully affect trust. 
 
4.1. Theoretical Implications 
 
Our results shed important light on three key 
theoretical questions in psychology and human-
computer interaction. First, expression modality has 
been previously linked to self-control decisions [1-3] 
but never to the related domain of trust. We identify a 
potential tie between these previously unconnected lines 
of research. Indeed, decades of research on human 
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evolution suggests that our society is based on norms of 
trust and cooperation, which are required for peaceful 
coexistence [33, 34]. Therefore, it may require self-
control, or at least the regulation of one’s intuitive 
response, to withhold trust. Whereas prior research 
demonstrates that verbally expressing one’s preferences 
leads the respondent to make more hedonistic choices, 
our research demonstrates that verbal communication 
with a machine may lead to a heuristic of trust.  
Second, the relationship between 
anthropomorphism and trust is not well-understood. 
Very little empirical research has examined this 
question. A recent meta-analysis on factors influencing 
trust in human-robot interactions identified only 29 
relevant empirical quantitative articles published 
between 1996 and 2010, of which only one article 
examined the effect of anthropomorphism on trust [35]. 
In our own search, we identified just one more 
experiment on anthropomorphism and trust. Both of 
these experiments show simply that machines that seem 
more human-like are also trusted more [5, 36]. But there 
are many reasons to believe that anthropomorphism 
may not linearly increase with trust—for instance, smart 
machines may be threatening [6]. We think it is unlikely 
in our study that participants felt threatened by the 
machine with whom they interacted. Indeed, in our raw 
data, there was a positive correlation between 
anthropomorphism and trust. However, once we 
controlled for other predictors of trust (e.g., comfort 
level), the association between anthropomorphism and 
trust became negative, suggesting there is much more to 
understand about this relationship.  
Third, how do we incite anthropomorphism of 
machines? Prior research has focused on perceiver 
characteristics that trigger anthropomorphism, 
suggesting there are two primary predictors of 
anthropomorphism, the perceiver’s motive for 
understanding and for connection [37]. But a much more 
direct method is to add human features to machines. For 
example, merely giving a robot a name, physical body, 
eyes, nationality, or gender makes it seem more 
humanlike and makes people interact it with more like 
they would with a human, compared with robots lacking 
these features [40, 41]. A simple read of this literature 
might suggest that adding any human cue to a machine 
will induce anthropomorphism. Yet our results indicate 
that this conclusion would be unwise. Perhaps the cues 
added to machines need to achieve a threshold 
“humanness” before they affect anthropomorphism. 
Adding a voice to a machine may not be sufficient for 
anthropomorphism if the voice does not sound 
adequately human, even though in theory any voice 
should be more humanizing than no voice.  
 
4.2 Limitations 
 
     Our study is limited in at least two ways. First, we 
operationalized trust as giving personal information to a 
machine, but this behavior may not perfectly express 
trust. For instance, it could also be related to 
convenience; disclosing more information can also 
seem more convenient in this context. Although self-
reported trust of the machine did strongly positively 
correlate with willingness to disclose information, our 
experimental condition did not affect self-reported trust. 
This indicates that there might be some discrepancy 
between this particular measure of trust and how lay 
people think about trust. Furthermore, we only used a 
single measure of trust instead of a full scale. Future 
research should test how interaction mode affects 
behavioral and self-reported trust using many different 
operationalizations, to better understand the construct of 
trust in this domain and what drives it. 
      Second, a gold standard for all research is 
independent direct and conceptual replication. We 
presented one study with intriguing evidence but it is 
critical that this research is replicated in other domains. 
This is particularly necessary for understanding 
generalizability. For example, would this pattern of data 
replicate with a different sample (e.g., older population, 
rural America, other countries)? Would it replicate with 
a different machine than Cleverbot?   
 
4.3. Future Directions 
 
Beyond the future directions implied by our 
limitations discussed in the prior section, our results also 
highlight other directions for future work. First, why 
exactly does expression modality affect trustworthy 
behavior? It is important to understand the 
psychological pathway between talking to machines and 
trusting them. The explanation that is best supported by 
prior research is that talking is associated with a hedonic 
or heuristic-driven mindset. If people are naturally 
trusting, this could result in greater trust in machines 
when talking to them. However, there are several other 
possible explanations. For one, talking may create a 
deeper feeling of engagement and sociability than 
typing, which could increase trust. A second possibility 
is the talking incites feelings of agency and control, 
which make individuals less suspicious about sharing 
their information. Future research could test these 
different possible explanations. 
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Second, there is a substantial need to better 
understand how adding human cues to machines affects 
anthropomorphism and trust. A comprehensive theory 
comparing the relative predictive power of each human 
cue on trust is lacking. It is unclear, for instance, 
whether human face or voice would be a better predictor 
of anthropomorphism. Which communication cues are 
most associated with innate humanness?  
Third, it is possible to investigate the level of trust 
a human has in a machine in further detail. For example, 
more granular levels of trust, based on level of human 
direction and machine autonomy, can be defined and 
tested. These factors align to current and emerging 
technology used in machines and can provide insight 
into the risk and acceptance of such technology. 
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